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THE CRIMINAL CODE OF ILLINOIS OF 1961
HOWARD NEWCOMB MORSE
HE Illinois General Assembly in 1961 replaced the Criminal
Code of 1874, as amended. This new Code contains many new
concepts which have not been defined or elucidated by the
courts. The purpose of this article is to present a detailed and analyti-
cal treatment, both explanatory and expository, of the more salient
features of the new Code, and to anticipate and speculate in re future
judicial construction thereof.
Section 1-2 states that "[t]he provisions of this Code shall be con-
strued in accordance with the general purposes hereof, to: .. . (c)
Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses and which permit recognition of differences in rehabilitation
possibilities among individual offenders." This section must be read in
pari materia with the constitutional provision that "[a]ll penalties shall
be proportioned to the nature of the offense."'
There are two theories under which the courts may proceed in
considering the consequences of the reference in the new statutory
section to "recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities"
as a criterion in prescribing penalties. One theory is to compare the
new statutory section and the organic provision to an oral statement
and a written instrument, respectively, and, by analogy to the parol
evidence rule, analyze the affect of the new statutory section on the
constitutional provision as one of amplification and explanation. The
other theory is to apply the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius to the organic provision at the expense of the new statutory
section. The first theory is preferable, as it is consistent with Francis
Wharton's theory of punishment 2 and its application has always had
an ameliorating and salutary effect upon the dispensing of criminal
justice.
I ILL. CONST. art. II, § 11. Unless otherwise indicated, all sections within the text are
to the Criminal Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38.
2 1 WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 13 (8th ed. 1888).
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Section 1-3 states that "No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is
described as an offense in this Code or in another statute of this State."
The purport of the last seven words is both remindful and cautionary.
Any statute is a criminal statute if it provides a term of imprisonment
or a fine, or if it uses the terms "felony" or "misdemeanor," and
criminal statutes are not relegated exclusively to the Criminal Code.
Section 3-1, in stating "no person shall be convicted of any offense
unless his guilt thereof is proved beyond a reasonable doubt," repre-
sents the first statutory affirmation in Illinois history of this ancient
bench law. In a relatively small minority of Illinois decisions concern-
ing the degree of the onus probandi in criminal cases, the phrase "to
a moral certainty" has been employed3 rather than, or in addition to,
the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt." A legalistic difference has
been suggested for the two phrases.4 However, two cases,5 albeit civil
cases arising in other jurisdictions, considered the issue directly, and
they resolved the matter by concluding that the two phrases have the
same legal meaning. In view of the reference to "beyond a reasonable
doubt" exclusively in section 3-1, "to a moral certainty" should not,
and probably will not, be used in the future by the Supreme Court of
Illinois.
Section 3-2 states that
"affirmative defense" means that unless the State's evidence raises the issue in-
volving the alleged defense, the defendant, to raise the issue, must present some
evidence thereon. If the issue involved in an affirmative defense is raised then
the State must sustain the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt as to that issue together with all the other elements of the
offense.
The word "some" means that the defendant, to raise the issue in-
volving the alleged defense, must adduce evidence thereon sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt.6 The state need not initially negative an
exception which withdraws certain acts or persons from the operation
3 People v. Vozel., 346 I11. 209, 178 N.E. 473 (1931); People v. Christocakos, 357 Ill. 599,
192 N.E. 677 (1934); People v. Hooper, 364 I11. 320, 4 N.E.2d 490 (1936); People v.
Botulinski, 383 Ill. 608, 50 N.E.2d 716 (1943).
4 Letter from Jay Schiller to the Editor, 36 CH. BAR REC. 380 (1955). At the time this
letter was written by Mr. Schiller, he was serving as an Assistant State's Attorney of
Cook County, Illinois.
5 Fidelity Mutual Life Assoc. v. Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 317 (1902); Williams v. Blue
Ridge Building and Loan Assoc., 207 N.C. 362, 364, 177 S.E. 2d 176, 177 (1934).
6 See People v. Durand, 307 I11. 611, 139 N.E.2d 78 (1923), which treated this concept
under the old Code.
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of a criminal statute. For the defendant to plead such an exception is
to invoke an affirmative defense or the equivalent thereof from an
evidentiary standpoint. Once the defendant contributes "some" evi-
dence to the effect that he or the criminal act which he is alleged to
have committed comes within the exception, the state must prove his
guilt by negativing the exception as well as his guilt as to all other
elements of the alleged criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The maximum effect of an "affirmative defense" is to enable the de-
fendant to impose upon the state responsibility for an additional ele-
ment which would not otherwise constitute a component of the
state's case. Examples of exceptions which the state must negative
once the defendant introduces "some" evidence as to the applicability
of such exception are found in sections 22-44,1 24-2(e),8 104-2 (c),
and chapter 121 /2, section 137.15. Section 22-44 and chapter 121 Y2,
section 137.15, refer to the defendant having the "burden of proving"
insofar as coming within the exception is concerned. These two
phrases represent very unfortunate language. What is incumbent upon
the defendant is to offer "some" evidence, not to discharge a burden
of proof.
It would be impossible to ascertain if the defendant fulfilled the
burden of proof unless the burden of proof shifted from the state to
him or unless a separate trial or hearing was held to determine the one
issue as to whether the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The burden of proof never shifts from the state to the defend-
ant in a criminal prosecution, for if it did even as to one point, the
presumption of innocence would be inferentially destroyed, and the
defendant would be put in the position of having to prove his inno-
cence as to such point beyond a reasonable doubt. There would be no
reason to hold a separate trial or hearing to determine whether the
defendant comes within the exception as the question of the applica-
bility of the exception goes to the issue of the guilt of the defendant.
Section 104-2(c) refers to the "burden of going forward with
evidence," not to the "burden of proving." The wording of section
104-2(c) represents a distinct improvement in verbiage. However,
the word "duty" would have been preferable to the word "burden."
The "burden of going forward with evidence" means the duty of
7 See People v. Williams, 23 Ill. 2d 549, 179 N.E.2d 639 (1962).
8 See People v. Saltis, 328 111. 494, 160 N.E. 86 (1928), which treated this concept
under the old Code.
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going forward with "some" evidence. In respect to section 104-2 (c),
once the defendant pleads that he comes within the exception repre-
sented by article 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and pro-
duces "some" evidence thereof, then the state must prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the defendant does not come within the
exception. The degree of proof of the burden of proof of the state
is reduced from "beyond a reasonable doubt" past "clear and con-
vincing evidence" all the way to a "preponderance of evidence"' be-
cause a separate hearing is held, with or without a special jury as the
case may be,'" to determine, not guilt at the time of the crime, but
competency at the time of the trial.
Section 66-1, of course, raises the age of the conclusive presumption
of incapacity of an infant to commit a crime from ten to thirteen
years, with the effect that henceforth a young criminal such as How-
ard Lang,1' aged twelve, will escape the toils of the law. The section
states: "No person shall be convicted of any offense unless he had
attained his thirteenth birthday at the time the offense was com-
mitted." The word "convicted" was substituted for the phrase "found
guilty" in old section 591. Technically, in neither case was any part
of the cause of action or all of the right of action by the state against
an infant below the specified age abolished. However, from a prag-
matic point of view, enough of the right of action was abolished so
as to protect the infant below the stipulated age from punishment, and
effectively to deter the state from prosecuting him. Even more im-
portantly, section 6-1, read in pari materia with section 35-1, seems
to indicate that the rebuttable presumption of incapacity of an infant
to commit a crime between the ages of ten and fourteen years has not
merely been narrowed to between the ages of thirteen and fourteen
years, but has been abrogated altogether. Former section 590 con-
tained the only mention of the age of fourteen years as to general
criminal responsibility, in the sense of presuming a "sound mind."
Former section 589 made a "sound mind" a condition precedent to
the formation of an "intention." And former section 588 provided that
an "intention" was an essential element of a "criminal offense," ex-
cept in cases involving "criminal negligence." Another line of reason-
ing which militates against the view that the rebuttable presumption
9 People v. Reck, 392 Ill. 311, 64 N.E.2d 526 (1946).
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 104-2 (a) (b).
Hi People v. Lang, 402 Il. 170, 83 N.E.2d 688 (1949).-
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of incapacity of an infant to commit a crime has been narrowed to
between thirteen and fourteen years was well expressed as follows:
Legislation which operates to revise the entire subject to which it relates, by
its very comprehensiveness gives strong implication of a legislative intent not
only to repeal former statutory law upon the subject, but also to supersede the
common law relating to the same subject. Therefore, the failure to set out for-
mer statutory provisions in a later comprehensive enactment will operate to
repeal the omitted provisions which are inconsistent, and former provisions
which are not repugnant to the later legislation as well. 12
An additional reason supporting the position that the rebuttable pre-
sumption of incapacity of an infant to commit a crime has been
abolished in toto is the fact that there are no corresponding delict
presumptions in Illinois law. If there were, the existence of a rebut-
table presumption of incapacity of an infant to commit a tort possibly
could be said to be indicative of a standard insofar as wrongs com-
mitted by infants are concerned.
Legal insanity in Illinois is governed by the following forty-six
words of section 6-2(a): "A person is not criminally responsible for
conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease
or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of law." The phrase "mental disease or mental defect" was
lifted from the case of Durham v. United States." The term "mental
disease" in turn was taken from State v. Pike.14 However, the 1843
M'Naghten case 15 contained the phrase "defect of reason from disease
of the mind." The word "result" was substituted for the word "prod-
uct" used in both the Pike and Durham cases.
The primary, or so-called M'Naghten, test of legal insanity is if
the man who committed the crime does not know the difference be-
tween right and wrong (the counterparts of good and evil in the
canonical law) as to a particular act constituting a crime at the time
of its commission. Jerome Hall urged that the word "know" as used
in the M'Naghten test be given "a wider definition so that it means
the kind of knowing that is relevant, i.e., realization or appreciation
of the wrongness of seriously harming a human being," or the wrong-
ness of any other individual act constituting a specific offense. The
12 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2018 (3rd ed. 1943).
1" 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 1449 N. H. 399 (1869).
15 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rcp. 718 (1843).
16 HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 520 (2d ed. 1960).
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word "appreciate" was employed instead of the word "know." As-
cribing the foregoing legal inflection to the word "know" and then
equating that word with the word "appreciate" would have the effect
of broadening the M'Nagbten test with the result that a defendant
in a criminal prosecution would be considered legally insane if he was
not capable of "conceptual thinking" at the time he committed the
individual act constituting the specific offense. Differentiating between
right and wrong in the abstract is compatible with "conceptual think-
ing," but distinguishing between right and wrong as to the particular
act constituting the crime is conterminous with "concrete thinking." 17
The M'Naghten test has never been directed to the difference between
right and wrong in the abstract, but instead always to the difference
between right and wrong as to the individual act constituting the
specific offense.
Vermont, in 1957, adopted a definition of legal insanity' 8 almost
identical to that which Illinois adopted four years later. However, the
1957 Vermont statute goes on to say "[t]he M'Naghton [sic] test of
insanity in criminal cases is hereby abolished." The last statement is
not entirely true, as the M'Naghten test was abolished by this defi-
nition of legal insanity only as an independent test. It exists as the
primary test in reciprocal dependency with another test (the super-
imposed secondary test).
The word "conform" was decided upon rather than the word
"choose," and as a consequence the phrase "to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law" was substituted for such phrases enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court of Illinois as "of choosing between them"'"
(right and wrong), "to choose either to do or not to do the act, and
of controlling his conduct in accordance with such choice,"2 ° "of
making intelligent choice in respect thereto,"'21 or "to choose to do or
not to do the act constituting the crime. 22 The inability to choose
to do right by refraining from choosing to do wrong as to the par-
ticular act constituting the crime at the time of its commission, or the
inability to carry out the choice to do right after choosing to do right
17 People v. Wolff, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 276, 394 P.2d 959, 964 (1964).
18 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4801 (1957).
19 Hopps v. People, 31111. 385, 392 (1863).
20 Dunn v. People, 109 111. 635, 644 (1884).
21 Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555, 586 (1886).
22 Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620, 625, 32 N.E. 677, 678 (1892).
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by refraining from choosing to do wrong as to the particular act con-
stituting the crime at the time of its commission, known as the "un-
controllable impulse" or "irresistible impulse" rule, is the alternative
test of legal insanity.
In Illinois, legal insanity was gauged by whether the man who
committed a crime knew the difference between right and wrong as
to the particular act constituting the crime at the time of its commis-
sion. In Illinois, the alternative test of legal insanity was if the man
who committed a crime knew the difference between right and wrong
as to the particular act constituting the crime at the time of its com-
mission, but was unable to choose to do right by refraining from
choosing to do wrong as to the particular act constituting the crime
at the time of its commission, or was unable to execute the choice to
do right after choosing to do right by refraining from choosing to
do wrong as to the particular act constituting the crime at the time
of its commission.
The importance of the new statutory definition of legal insanity in
Illinois lies in the superimposing upon the primary test or the alterna-
tive test "mental disease or mental defect" as a secondary test. This
secondary test superimposed upon the primary test means that lack of
knowledge of the difference between right and wrong as to the par-
ticular act constituting the crime at the time of its commission must
be the result of a "mental disease or mental defect" and not due to some
other cause, or attributable to some other source, such as, for example,
complete or almost complete ignorance of moral values so as to con-
stitute amorality or inculcation in the wrong set of moral values. The
secondary test superimposed upon the alternative test means that in-
ability to choose to do right and to carry out such choice by refrain-
ing from choosing to do wrong and from executing such choice as to
the particular act constituting the crime at the time of its commission,
even though possessed of knowledge of the difference between right
and wrong as to the particular act constituting the crime at the time of
its commission, must be the result of a"mental disease or mental de-
fect" and not due to some other cause or attributable to some other
source. The so-called Durham test was adopted in New Hampshire
and the District of Columbia by case law; Maine adopted it by statute.
The best diminutive definition of the Durham test is contained in the
1963 Maine statute and reads as follows: "An accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
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mental defect. ' 12 3 By her new definition of legal insanity, Illinois has
adopted the Durham test, not as an independent test for legal insanity,
but rather as the superincumbent secondary test existing only in mu-
tual dependency with one or the other of the basic tests (the primary
or the alternative test).
The foregoing analysis of insanity of course refers to legal insanity,
as contradistinguished from medical insanity. In order to better under-
stand insanity, it is necessary to compare it with criminal incompe-
tency and what is meant by sexually dangerous persons, even though
the latter two conditions are provided for in the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure rather than in the Criminal Code. In this respect, the author is
treating of a "bridge concept," that is, a generic doctrine that pervades
both new Illinois codes in the criminal area.
The most important aspects in which insanity differs from the crim-
inal incompetency delineated in the Code of Criminal Procedure are as
follows: insanity represents a more drastic, a more severe, condition
than criminal incompetency; insanity represents a fairly general con-
dition whereas criminal incompetency represents a fairly specific con-
dition; insanity represents a mental condition exclusively whereas
criminal incompetency may represent either a mental or a physical
condition. The tests of criminal incompetency, unlike the foregoing
tests of insanity, are inability on the part of a person charged with an
offense to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
against him, inability on the part of a person charged with an offense
to assist in his defense or inability on the part of a person, after a death
sentence has been imposed, to understand the nature and purpose of
such sentence; and the time period with which insanity is associated is
the time of the commission of the crime, whereas the time periods to
which criminal incompetency is related are before trial, during trial,
after a judgment has been entered but before pronouncement of sen-
tence, or after a death sentence has been imposed but before execution
of that sentence.
If the court has reason to believe, but does not necessarily believe,
that the defendant is criminally incompetent, a criminal incompetency
hearing must be ordered by the court sua sponte or in response to the
raising of the issue of criminal incompetency in the same manner in
which an affirmative defense is raised. Whether the defendant is thought
to be criminally mentally incompetent or criminally physically in-
23 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 149, § 17-B (1964).
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competent, the test or tests under which the defendant is thought to
be criminally incompetent should always be specified. However, the
public prosecutor, as well as the defense counsel, may raise the issue of
criminal incompetency by filing a petition to that effect, although
usually when such an issue is raised it is filed, as would be expected, by
the latter. It would be ironical for the prosecution to raise the issue of
criminal incompetency based upon the second test, since the prosecu-
tion is not in a position to have knowledge of this comparable to the
defense counsel. Also, even though the issue of criminal incompetency
is raised, the additional element of criminal competency is not auto-
matically cast upon the state to prove, because the court is not obliged
to order a criminal incompetency hearing unless the court has reason
to believe that the defendant is criminally incompetent, and of this the
court is the sole and final arbiter. The Tentative Final Draft provided
that the "burden of proving"2 4 was on the party requesting determina-
tion of criminal incompetency. The phraseology of this provision was
changed for the better to the "burden of going forward with evi-
dence."2 5 "Duty" would have been a preferable word to "burden." At
this point, the absurdity of the provision authorizing the state to raise
the issue of criminal incompetency becomes apparent, for if the state
raises the issue by entering a plea and buttresses such plea with "some"
evidence, which must be more than a scintilla but may be less than half
of the totality of the evidence submitted, and if the court finds that it
has reason to believe that the defendant is criminally incompetent, then
the state would be in the anomalous position of having to refute and
disprove, in all likelihood, at least part of its own evidence as to the
criminal incompetency of the defendant in order to prove by a pre-
ponderance of evidence that the defendant is criminally competent.
The Tentative Final Draft 6 also provided that, if the court has reason
to believe that the defendant was criminally incompetent during the
trial, at which it was mandatory for the court to order a criminal in-
competency hearing, it was discretionary with the court as to whether
such hearing should be a jury hearing or a bench hearing. This provi-
sion was changed 27 so that, like a sexually dangerous person trial under
article 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a jury is impanelled
only if the defendant or the respondent asks for it. Under article 104
24 ILL. CODE OF CRIM. PROC., p. 30 (Tent. Final Draft § 40-2 (c), 1963).
25 ILL. CODE OF CRIM. PROC., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 104-2 (c) (1963).
2 6 Supra note 24 at 29. 27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 105-5 (1963).
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of that code the jury is deemed to be a special one since there already
is a petit jury. In addition, under article 105 of the same code, the pro-
ceeding is designated a trial as well as a hearing, because once the
charge of a criminal offense is instituted, the filing of the petition pre-
vents any trial in respect to such charge and gives rise to only one pro-
ceeding, that of the sexually dangerous person trial. The proceeding
under article 104 is exclusively termed a hearing, because there is a jury
trial or a bench trial as to the issue of guilt, and the proceeding as to
the issue of criminal incompetency is in addition thereto. However, in
respect to the other three time periods, a special jury hearing is man-
datory unless the special jury is waived by the defendant. A special
jury is mandatory, unless waived by the defendant, in a criminal in-
competency hearing in Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.
The burden of proof is incumbent upon the state to prove the crim-
inal competency 28 of the defendant by a preponderance of evidence 29
because a criminal incompetency hearing is a civil proceeding gov-
erned by civil rules of evidence. The court may appoint experts, to be
compensated by the county, to examine the defendant with or with-
out his consent. Any statements made by the defendant during such
examination, and any ostensible evidence discovered as a result of such
statements, would be inadmissible. The criminal proceedings and the
statute of limitations as to the alleged crime are tolled during a criminal
incompetency hearing.
If the court orders a criminal incompetency hearing during the
criminal trial, the court must "suspend," not terminate, the criminal
trial, meaning that the petit jury in all probability would be locked up
while the criminal incompetency hearing proceeds and until it is con-
cluded. If the defendant is found to be criminally competent at the
hearing, the criminal trial will be "resumed," not started anew. If the
defendant is found to be criminally incompetent at the hearing, the
criminal trial will be terminated but the statute of limitations as to the
crime with which he was charged will remain tolled.
If the defendant is found to be criminally physically incompetent,
he remains subject to order or call of court, and in the interim may be
free on bail or recognizance. If the defendant is found to be criminally
mentally incompetent, he is committed to the Department of Mental
28 People v. Bender, 20 Il. 2d 45, 169 N.E.2d 328 (1960).
29 People v. Reck, 392 Ill. 311, 64 N.E. 2d 526 (1946).
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Health and confined in either a public or private mental hospital, if a
public mental facility, probably the Security Hospital at Chester, Illi-
nois. Conditions which could cause or constitute criminal mental in-
competency are amnesia, feeblemindedness, epilepsy, and a mono-
mania, particularly in reference to a subject not germane to the crime
of which the defendant is accused. Unlike article 105, under which
only the committing court can conduct a recovery hearing, article 104
authorizes a recovery hearing in either the committing county or the
county in which the person is confined. If the person is adjudged to
be recovered the criminal prosecution shall be reactivated, and if such
person is found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment the time during
which he was confined as the result of his commitment shall be cred-
ited against his sentence. To try a criminally incompetent defendant
for an offense would be analogous to trying a defendant for a criminal
offense in absentia.
Differing from both legal insanity and criminal incompetency is the
condition constituting a "sexually dangerous person," as provided for
in article 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 105-1.01
states as follows:
All persons suffering from a mental disorder, which mental disorder has existed
for a period of not less than one year, immediately prior to the filing of the
petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities toward
acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children, are hereby de-
clared sexually dangerous persons.
This section represented a 1955 amendment30 to a 1938 statute,"x which
contained the phrase "and not insane or feebleminded" after the phrase
"all persons suffering from a mental disorder." The presumption in
which we must indulge is that the legislative omission of the phrase
"and not insane or feebleminded" was ex industria.12 Therefore, since
the 1955 amendment, a sexually dangerous person is not necessarily
legally sane and thus could be legally insane. However, we must also
presume against a general duplication being intended by the legislature
insofar as the 1955 amendment and section 6-2 (a) are concerned.
Just as a monomania pertinent to the crime of which the defendant
is accused may constitute legal insanity and a monomania not relevant
ao Ill. Laws 1955, at 1144. 81 III. Laws 1938, 1st Sp. Sess., at 28.
82 See Morse, A Study in the Significance of Constitutional Word-Omission Ex
Industria, 37 KY. L.J. 78 (1948).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
to the crime of which the defendant is accused cannot constitute legal
insanity but may constitute criminal mental incompetency, so the
monomania of criminal sexual psychopathy (designated "a mental dis-
order" in section 105-1.01), existing in conjunction with at least two
crimes which are sexual in nature and are directed against children, is
the only monomania which may constitute legal insanity but which
nevertheless may be dealt with elsewhere than under section 6-2 (a)
(namely, under article 105 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and
raised as an issue by designated public prosecuting authorities (Attor-
ney General or State's Attorney) rather than by the defendant.
The definition of a sexually dangerous person contains three com-
ponents: "a mental disorder" (the monomania of criminal sexual psy-
chopathy, one particular medical form of such monomania, for exam-
ple, being pedophilia), "criminal propensities to the commission of sex
offenses," and "demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual as-
sault or acts of sexual molestation of children."
In regard to the phrase "acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual mo-
lestation of children," the reference to children applies to "acts of
sexual assault" as well as to "acts of sexual molestation." This inter-
pretation is reinforced by section 825 (f), which refers exclusively to
children and which since its enactment in 1957, has been in pari mate-
ria with the sexually dangerous persons statute. In relation to the sec-
ond component, "sex offenses" in general will not suffice insofar as the
applicability of article 105 is concerned as "the commission of sex
offenses" is not required; all that is required is "criminal propensities
to the commission of sex offenses."
In respect to the third component, the phrases "sexual assault" and
"sexual molestation" are not the names of any specific sex offenses in
either the old or the new Criminal Code. Within article 11 of the new
Code the three specific offenses of indecent liberties with a child,33
contributing to the sexual delinquency of a child 34 and indecent solici-
tation of a child35 constitute both "sexual assault," because the victim
is under the statutory age-16, 18 and 13 years, respectively-and is,
therefore, legally incapable of effecting consent, and "sexual molesta-
tion."
The gravamen word "propensity" denotes a disposition, a procliv-
ity, a pattern; one would have to commit at least two acts of sexual
33 ILL. CRIM. CODE, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4 (1961).
34 Supra at § 11-5. 35 Supra at.§ 11-6.
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assault, two acts of sexual molestation or one act of sexual assault and
one act of sexual molestation on separate occasions in order to come
within the application of article 105. The use of the phrase "coupled
with" preceding the phrase "criminal propensities to the commission
of sex offenses" in conjunction with the use of the word "and" follow-
ing the last-mentioned phrase seems to mean, in reference to the pre-
ceding requirement of at least one year's duration immediately prior to
the filing of the petition for the monomania of criminal sexual psy-
chopathy ("a mental disorder"), that at least two acts of one or both
of the two proscribed types of acts must have occurred during the
same time period.
Only the Attorney General or the State's Attorney may file the
petition. The two public authorities are mentioned in this order prob-
ably so as to camouflage the reason for the designating of two public
officials instead of one, that of holding intervention by the Attorney
General as a threat over the State's Attorney should the latter be re-
miss in not filing the petition in an excessive number of obvious cases
(possibly effective, however, only if the two are of different political
affiliation). The requirement that the respondent must be charged
with a criminal offense before the petition may be filed envisions any
specific offense of any type whatsoever.
Once the petition and the report by two qualified psychiatrists of at
least five years' standing are filed, the trial will be held. A jury will be
impaneled only if the respondent asks for it. At the trial, evidence of
all prior crimes of whatever nature committed by the respondent is
admissible. The trial is a civil proceeding subject to civil rules of
evidence.
If the respondent is found to be a sexually dangerous person, the
court shall appoint the Director of Public Safety as his guardian. The
Department of Mental Health must examine the patient if requested to
do so by the Department of Public Safety. The Director of Public
Safety may place the patient in the Psychiatric Division of the Illinois
State Penitentiary at Menard, Illinois, or, with the consent of its Di-
rector, in the care and treatment of the Department of Mental Health.
The application alleging that the patient has fully recovered may be
filed by any party in interest but only in the committing court. The
disposition of the application may result in continued detention, con-
ditional release (if the court finds it impossible to determine with cer-
tainty under conditions of institutional care that the patient has fully
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recovered) or absolute discharge. A patient conditionally released
might be described as a "parolee-outpatient." With the view of obtain-
ing the absolute discharge of a conditionally-released patient, the ap-
plication alleging full recovery may be filed by any interested party
in the committing court. If any of the terms prescribed as to condi-
tional release are violated by the patient, the court must revoke such
conditional release and re-commit the patient, and no hearing as to
such revocation is required. An absolute discharge effects the quashing
of every outstanding information and indictment, the basis of which
was the reason for the detention. The last provision, in suggesting that
the detention may be predicated upon more than one indictment, seems
inconsistent with the earlier provision to the effect that in otherwise
correct circumstances, the petition may be filed by the proper public
officer only when the "person is charged with a criminal offense."
Obviously, if two charges were brought and the public prosecutor
filed the petition after the second charge was instituted, it was the
second, and not the first, charge which prompted him to act and,
therefore, the detention could be related to only the second charge.
Only the charge which provoked the public prosecutor into filing the
petition could be considered the causative agency.
The second type of petition which may allege only partial recovery
may be filed in the committing court only by the Director of Public
Safety, and its disposition may result in only continued detention or
conditional release, with the same provision governing as to the effect
of a violation of the terms prescribed for such conditional releases.
While a patient is out on conditional release as a result of such action,
any interested party, including the Director of Public Safety, may file
a recovery application. If a patient, after receiving an absolute dis-
charge, commits an act of sexual assault or molestation against a child,
the preliminary requirements for the application of article 105 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure must be commenced anew. The defend-
ant cannot be recommitted, but has to be criminally prosecuted.
The not inconsiderable legal significance accorded a motor vehicle
in Illinois perhaps is best illustrated by the fact that the larceny of a
motor vehicle was made a felony irrespective of its value. The surest
way for a householder to prevent a thief from making off with his
motorcar would be for him to shoot the thief. However, section 7-3
provides that the householder would be "justified in the use of force
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which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only
if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent the
commission of forcible felony." The theft of an automobile, however,
is not a forcible felony in section 2-8.
While Colorado, 6 Georgia37 and Nevada38 have three distinct legal
types of murder, Illinois, under the old Criminal Code, had as many as
four distinct legal types, for, in addition to the general murder statute39
declaratory of the crime of murder at common law, the felony-
murder rule under the "prosecution of a felonious intent" clause of
the involuntary manslaughter proviso4° and the "naturally tends to
destroy the life of human being" clause in the same involuntary man-
slaughter proviso,4' there was also the 1923 poisonous liquor statute.4 2
Unquestionably, one of the principal innovations of the new Criminal
Code is the reduction of the number of the distinct legal types of mur-
der to the traditional first two, both of which are embodied in section
9-1.
Section 9-3, of course, dispensed with the "naturally tends to de-
stroy the life of a human being" clause in the old "involuntary man-
slaughter proviso." The "naturally tends to destroy the life of a human
being" clause in the "proviso" had great potential value in Illinois law
but its value was never realized except in the Goldvarg case,43 and that
decision did not definitely tell us what that clause of the "proviso"
meant, even though a similar "proviso" clause has been widely used to
good advantage in Georgia law.44
Sections 11-4 and 11-10 omit the gravamen-words "lascivious" and
"licentiously," respectively. Section 11-4 includes the concept of statu-
tory rape within the crime of indecent liberties, yet it transfers the
36 General murder statute: COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-1 (1953); felony-murder rule:
COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2-3, 40-2-7 (1953); involuntary manslaughter proviso: COL.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-7 (1953).
37 General murder statute: GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1002 (1964); felony-murder rule:
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1009 (1964); involuntary manslaughter proviso: GA. CODE ANN.
§ 26-1009 (1964).
38 General murder statute: NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.010 (1963); felony-murder rule:
NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.070 (1963); involuntary manslaughter proviso: NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 200.070 (1963).
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (1959). This statute was repealed by the Criminal Code
of 1961.
40 Supra at 363. 42 Supra note 39 at 373 (a). 41 Ibid.
43 People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931).
44 Morse, The Involuntary Manslaughter Proviso in Georgia, 12 GA. BAR J. 285 (1950).
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former statutory rape age of the victim of sixteen years to indecent
liberties, the age for which was formerly fifteen years.
The inconsistencies of the new Illinois Criminal Code are pro-
nounced. While section 11-7 makes adultery stricter by including sex-
ual intercourse as well as cohabitation, thus terminating the effect of
the Miner case, 45 which held that a single act, or even a number of acts,
of illicit intercourse does not constitute adultery, section 11-4(b)
makes indecent liberties "liberal" by offering three new defenses to
bigamy, and section 11-11, by omission, exempts uncles and nieces,
nephews and aunts, grandfathers and granddaughters, grandsons and
grandmothers, and first cousins from the crime of incest.
Section 11-16 refers to pandering for money and section 11-19 men-
tions money or other property in connection with pimping. The ques-
tion arises as to whether "or other property" is included by necessary
implication in the pandering statute since that statute and the pimping
statute are cognate laws, and the construction of one may involve the
interpolation of both. However, also relevant are the rudimentary rules
in respect to the strict interpretation which should be afforded penal
statutes and the following admonition by the New York Court of
Appeals: "It is a strong thing so to read into a statute words which are
not there and, in the absence of a clear necessity, it is a wrong thing to
do."4 6
Section 11-20, which deals with obscenity, defines obscenity in terms
of prurient and then proceeds to define "prurient." With this type of
definitive legislation, if the courts should rule that prurient lacks ade-
quate legal content, the obscenity statute would fall. In New York, after
the Supreme Court of the United States held in the Commercial Pic-
tures Corporation case 47 that the word "immoral" in the film-licensing
section of the Education Law48 was not susceptible of sufficiently pre-
cise legal meaning, the legislature amended the pertinent section49 in
April of 1954 so as to define "immoral." But the Supreme Court, in the
Kingsley case, 0 struck down the amended provision for substantially
45 Miner v. People, 58 Il. 59 (1871).
4 6 Palmer v. Spaulding, 299 N.Y. 368, 372, 87 N.E.2d 301, 303 (1949).
47 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New York, 346
U.S. 587 (1954).
48 N.Y. EDUc. LAW S 122. 49 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 122-a.
50 Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of University of State of New
York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
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the same reason. The meaning accorded "immoral" by the New York
legislature was a narrowly-restricted one, making "immoral" almost
synonymous with "prurient." However, the basis for a certain degree
of confidence that our new obscenity statute will survive the rigors of
judicial probing is the fact that "immoral" is a word of breadth and
depth of meaning while the converse is true of "prurient."
The "predominant appeal" test established by section 11-20 for de-
termining obscenity is analogous to the "dominant element" test51 ap-
plied for determining gaming in many jurisdictions. If the "dominant
element" rule should be invalidated in other jurisdictions, the reason-
ing employed to accomplish such result might be used with equal force
by our courts to render inoperative the predominant appeal rule. The
principal possible ground for attack probably would be the contention
of impossibility or extreme hardship of theoretical or pragmatic ad-
measurement. Apparently the converse of the predominant appeal and
dominant element tests is the "in part" dependency upon skill test es-
tablished in section 28-2 (a) for determining a "gaming device." "In
part" does not mean a minimum, modicum or scintilla but means, ac-
cording to the Illinois Supreme Court in the One Mechanical Device
case, "some," possibly considerable or substantial, although servient
or subservient.
Section 12-4(b) (3) (4) constitutes the foremost example in the
new Criminal Code of reference by implication. Section 13-1, which
treats of civil rights, contains the leading example in the new Code of
ejusdem generis. The concluding phrase "and all other places of pub-
lic accommodation and amusement" in paragraph (a) probably is
broad enough to cover, for example, ambulances and hospitals, billiard
parlors and bowling alleys, respectively.
In section 16-1 the word "theft" was employed instead of the word
"larceny" because of the inclusion of the concept of embezzlement,
and correspondingly, the word "obtain" was used rather than the word
"take." Statutory recognition of the larger meaning of "obtain" is
consistent with the decision of that highly-vaunted court of last resort
of criminal jurisdiction, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, in the
Allen case."a At first glance, section 16-1 (c) might appear to be unduly
51 Morse, The Dominant Element Rule, 58 DICK. L. REV. 394 (1954).
52 People v. One Mechanical Device 11 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 142 N.E. 2d 98, 101 (1957).
53 Allen v. State, 97 Tex. Cr. 467-469, 262 S.W. 502, 503 (1924).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
similar to section 18-1 (a), which deals with robbery. However, upon
analysis the following differences become apparent: the word "ob-
tains" is employed in regard to theft whereas the word "takes" is used
in reference to robbery; any one of the eleven types of threats estab-
lished in section 15-5 might be referred to in regard to theft while only
the first type of threat is referred to in reference to robbery; control
over the property is referred to in regard to theft whereas the prop-
erty .itself is referred to in reference to robbery; control over the prop-
erty may be obtained away from the person or presence of the victim
of theft while the property must be taken from the person or presence
of the victim of robbery; and the owner is referred to as the victim of
theft but not of robbery. It is incongruous that robbery and armed
robbery, included within sections 18-1 and 18-2, respectively, are con-
sidered as "Offenses Directed Against Property," particularly in view
of the fact that robbery is listed as a forcible felony in section 2-8 and
the fact that a forcible felony is defined as involving "the use or threat
of physical force or violence against any individual." This incongruity
can be explained as follows: The Criminal Code of Louisiana of 1942
classified armed robbery5 4 and simple robbery55 under "Offenses
Against Property." The Criminal Code of Wisconsin of 1955, which
is based largely on the Louisiana Criminal Code, classifies robbery56
under "Crimes Against Property," even though the Wisconsin Statutes
of 1953 had classified robbery" under "Offenses Against Lives and
Persons." Our Code in turn is based largely on the Louisiana and Wis-
consin Criminal Codes. Probably the Wisconsin legislature inadver-
tently followed the Louisiana classification of robbery and our legis-
lature followed suit insofar as the Louisiana-Wisconsin classification in
this respect is concerned.
Section 19-1 made no legal changes whatsoever in regard to bur-
glary. All the new statute does is eliminate such old-fashioned des-
ignations as "malt-house," "stilling-house" and "meetinghouse." The
words "house trailer" were added to the new burglary statute. How-
ever, house trailer was included in the word "office" (when a house
trailer is used as an office) in the old statute under the implied law of
54 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. S 14:64 (1950).
55 Supra at 5 14:65.
6 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 943.32 (1958).
57 WIs. STAT. §§ 340.39, 340.43 (1953).
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the Parsons case." The Arizona burglary statute59 also contained the
word "office" but not the word "trailer" until its 1951 amendment. 60
More importantly, house trailer was included in the gravaman-phrase
"dwelling house" in the old statute under the implied law of the North
Carolina federal case of Evans v. Hughes,61 which, although a civil
case, contained wordage of sufficient scope to cover the concept of
burglary in relation to a house trailer. The word "aircraft" also was
added to the new burglary statute. However, the phrase "or other
building" in the old statute included aircraft under ejusdein generis,
especially since the statute contained the phrases "wharfboat, steam-
boat, or other water craft" and "freight or passenger railroad car."
Section 27-1 (a) established a tendency "to provoke a breach of the
peace" as the gravamen of criminal defamation. This gravamen existed,
not in the old libel statute (section 402), but in the old Group Libel
Act (section 471).
Section 27-2, as was the former section, is totally ineffective, since
justification for alleged defamation was arrogated to the Constitution
of Illinois. 2 But whereas the former section merely repeated wordage
of the constitutional provision, the new statute changed "published"
to "communicated" and "sufficient" to "affirmative." "Communicated"
is a broader term than "published" as it more clearly indicates the oral
as well as the written. And "affirmative," although not so strong a word
as "sufficient," was used in order to be consistent with its use elsewhere
in the Code as authorized by section 3-2, and because it was used in
preference to "sufficient" by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the crim-
inal defamation cases of People v. Fuller6 3 and People v. Strauch.6 4
However, altering in statutory form verbiage contained in the Consti-
tution is a presumptuous excursion in futility.
Section 28-2(a), which excepted from the definition of a gaining
device
a coin-in-the-slot-operated mechanical device played for amusement which re-
wards the player with the right to replay such mechanical device, which device
is so constructed or devised as to make such result of the operation thereof
58 State v. Parsons, 70 Ariz. 399, 402-403, 222 P.2d 637, 639-640 (1950).
59 ARIZ. CODE ANN. ch. 43, S 9-1 (1939).
60 Ariz. Laws 1951, at 364, 365.
61 135 F. Supp. 555, 557 (M.D.N.C. 1955).
62 ILL. CoNsT. art. II, S 4. 63 238 Il. 116, 136, 87 N.E. 336, 342 (1909).
64 247 I11. 220, 233, 93 N.E. 126, 132 (1910).
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depend in part upon the skill of the player and which returns to the player
thereof no coins, tokens, or merchandise...
is a prime example in the new Code of exclusionary legislation. The
foregoing exception was adopted by the legislature in 1953.5
Section 28-8 raised the minimum recoverable amount of a gambling
loss from ten to fifty dollars and no longer required that half of a
treble recovery by a member of the public go to the county upon the
loser's failing to bring an action for six months.
While the reasoning behind section 33-2 requiring a public officer,
public employee or juror to report a bribe under penalty of commit-
ting a crime for failure to do so is not easy to appreciate, it nevertheless
is easier to appreciate than section 29-3, a similar provision requiring
professional and amateur athletes to become informers, as the latter
persons, unlike the former, are not clothed with a public capacity.
Section 31-8 proscribes refusing or knowingly failing reasonably
upon command to aid a person known to be a peace officer if he is
apprehending a criminal or preventing the commission of a crime.
Thus, a law enforcement officer's command to a person to render aid
makes of such person an involuntary good samaritan under penalty of
being guilty of the commission of a misdemeanor. Perhaps it would
have been wiser to have made disobedience of the officer's command a
felony, as is the case in Colorado. 6 This section brings to mind the
other "involuntary good samaritan" concept in Illinois statutory law,
the 1935 act requiring the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
to
render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including
the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying of such person
to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or surgical treatment, if it is
apparent that such treatment is necessary, or if such carrying is requested
by the injured person.67
Section 31-8, in order to be fully understood, must be considered in
conjunction with section 107-8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 107-8 refers only to the apprehension or arrest situation (sec-
tion 31-8 uses the word "apprehend" and section 107-8 uses the word
"arrest"), limiting the arrest to a lawful one and restricting those per-
sons whom a peace officer may command to come to his assistance to
65 Ill. Laws 1953, § 2, at 930.
06 COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-20 (1953).
07 1L. REV. STAT. ch. 952, § 135 (1963).
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male persons over the age of eighteen. Section 107-8 affords the same
authority to the person commanded to aid a law enforcement officer
as that possessed by the officer and extends civil immunity to such per-
son as to any reasonable conduct in aid of the officer. The offense (the
word "offense" is used in section 31-8 but not in section 107-8) for
which a person is apprehended (under section 31-8) or arrested (un-
der section 107-8) may be the violation of a criminal municipal ordi-
nance under section 107-8 according to section 102-15 but not so un-
der section 31-8 according to section 2-12.
Hence, it is evident that the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 contains
many incongruities and anomalies which will have to be corrected by
the legislature. It is the hope of the author that this exposition and ex-
planation of certain key provisions will aid in an understanding of the
meaning and effect of the 1961 Criminal Code.
